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Abstract 
We develop a theory of human capital investment to study the channels through which students react 
to school quality when deciding on investments in secondary education and above, and to study how 
educational  quality  affects  economic  growth.  In  a  dynamic  general  equilibrium  closed  economy, 
primary education is mandatory but there is an opportunity to continue on in education, which is a 
private choice. High-quality education increases the returns to schooling, and hence the incentives to 
accumulate human capital. This is caused by two main effects: higher quality makes higher education 
accessible to more people (extensive channel), and once individuals decide to participate in higher 
education, higher quality increases the volume of investment made per individual (intensive channel). 
Furthermore, educational quality plays a central role in explaining the composition of human capital 
and the long-run level of income. Cross-country data evidence shows that the proposed channels are 
quantitatively important and that the effect of the quality and quantity of education on growth depends 
on the stage of development. 
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This paper seeks to understand what drives schooling decisions regarding higher education (i.e.,
secondary and tertiary education) and why educational attainment levels diﬀer widely with the level
of economic development. Two salient features are worth noting. First, most of the population in
poor coutries have only a primary education or none at all. Second, higher education attainments
increases with income and diﬀers substantially across countries. Possible explanations for this could
be, for example, the typical credit constraints story (e.g., Galor and Zeira, 1993; Mookherjee and
Ray, 2003) and the existence of skill-biased technical change (e.g., Galor and Moav, 2000). In this
paper, we analyze an alternative explanation that posits cross-country diﬀerences in the quality of
the educational system.
As preliminary evidence of how important the quality of education may be, we plot enrollment
rates in secondary education and a measure of educational quality in each country.1 The results
are striking. Figure 1 shows a positive correlation between educational quality and enrollment
rates in secondary schooling when the quality of education is relatively high –a correlation that
disappears when the quality of the educational system is below a threshold level. Moreover, the
upper and lower extremes in the ﬁgure also show that, on average, the countries with a high-quality
educational system are mainly the high-income OECD economies, whereas those with low-quality
educational systems are the less-developed countries.2
Motivated by these observations, we develop an analytical theory to study how the quality of
the educational system inﬂuences individuals’ decisions to invest in higher education, which in turn
aﬀects the distribution of educational attainment and allows for diﬀerent paths of development.
Speciﬁcally, the objective of this paper is to shed light on the following questions: Can educational
quality account for higher education, which is essentially non-mandatory education? And if so, what
are the channels through which educational quality operates? And how can educational quality aﬀect
the long-run income level?
To answer these questions, we present a model of schooling decisions where growth results from
the accumulation of physical and human capital. We ﬁnd a simple closed-form solution, which allows
us to identify the mechanisms at work and thus provides a theoretical foundation to check the results
empirically. Our theory is based on the following assumptions. First, the quality of the educational
system is exogenous and, motivated by the evidence of Hanushek and Woessmann (2008), aﬀects
the returns on education so that high-quality education provides more human capital per level of
schooling. Second, agents are heterogeneous along two dimensions –ability and inherited wealth–
1The quality of the educational system is measured through scores in internationally comparable tests, taken from
Hanushek and Kimko (2000); the enrollment rates in secondary education are taken from Barro and Lee (1994) and
UNESCO.
2A potential problem with these internationally comparable test scores is that they could measure innate abilities.
First, it seems reasonable to assume that average ability of students does not vary across countries. Second, even
assuming that high-ability agents in developing countries would enter secondary schooling more often than low-ability
agents in the same countries, and that the average ability level of secondary students would decline as secondary
education expands, we would then expect a negative correlation between quality and enrollment rates across income
levels. This would imply that Figure 1 is still robust to these assumptions.
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Figure 1: Quality and Quantity of Education
but capital markets are perfect. The essential implication of this last assumption is that schooling
decisions are made independently of the current distribution of wealth levels. Although capital
markets for education are far from perfect in reality, this assumption allows us to isolate and best
illustrate the role played by education quality. Adding imperfections in the capital markets would
reinforce our results. Third, every individual is assumed to have the elementary skills that are taught
in primary school, since primary schooling is compulsory and publicly provided. People can choose
to continue with their education, but this decision requires the investment of private resources. That
is, agents decide whether or not to pursue higher education, and if so, how much to spend on it.
Accordingly, our focus is on the evolution of higher education, under the assumption that the goal
of universal basic literacy has already been met.
Our proposed theoretical model makes several predictions. It identiﬁes two potential channels
through which the quality of the educational system aﬀects human capital accumulation. On the one
hand, low educational quality decreases the returns from education and discourages access to higher
schooling across a broader segment of the population. As a result, low quality could act as a barrier to
pursuing higher education. We refer to this eﬀect as the extensive channel. On the other hand, once
individuals participate in higher education, high-quality educational systems raise the investments
in higher schooling made by each person. We call this the intensive channel. Our empirical evidence,
based on cross-country data, suggests that the proposed channels are quantitatively important.
General equilibrium forces also impact schooling choices through changes in prices, reinforcing
the eﬀects of quality on educational attainment. As output per capita increases, agents have more
incentives to invest in higher education. Higher per capita GDP aﬀects the returns as well as the cost
of education, since as wages increase, the marginal returns on education rise, while its opportunity
cost –given by the interest rate– falls.
We show that in every period, the economy, as an aggregate, is entirely characterized by the
aggregate output per worker, and that how this variable evolves depends on the level of educational
quality. Therefore, this parameter determines the level of income in the long run. Indeed, when
educational quality is relatively low, only the extensive channel is at work. Individuals would
3optimally decide to stop after completing primary education and invest only in physical capital,
but then aggregate output would be low. This would bring low returns to secondary education,
discouraging individuals from going to secondary school, and so on. Conversely, when educational
quality is very high, everyone goes on to a secondary education or beyond. Additionally, all people
make the optimal investment in higher schooling, so that the economy is at the maximum possible
income level in the steady state. Therefore, in our model, higher education is larger in relatively
developed economies, and is positively correlated with the quality of the educational system.
Studying the quality of the educational system is important in itself, since education translates
into a more productive and eﬃcient labor force. However, while the quantitative aspects of human
capital have been studied intensively, less attention has been given to the qualitative aspects of
education. An exception is the recent research seeking to quantify the role of educational quality as
a determinant of cross-country income diﬀerences (see e.g., Erosa et al., 2010; Manuelli and Seshadri,
2007; Schoellman, forthcoming).3 Our paper concentrates on the eﬀect of education quality on higher
education and on how educational quality determines the long-run income level. Surprisingly, there
is a continuing dearth of papers addressing this issue, and we contribute to ﬁlling this gap in several
respects.4
First, no study so far has analyzed how educational quality aﬀects decisions to enter higher
education, and once enrolled, how much to invest in higher schooling.5 We show that, due to the
extensive channel, educational quality could become a barrier to investments beyond the primary
level. Consequently, we complement the literature on multiplicity of equilibria by providing an
alternative theory that focuses on the importance of the quality of the educational system instead
of emphasizing the typical role of borrowing constraints in producing an obstacle to human capital
accumulation.6
Second, our model focuses on how human capital composition changes with income per capita.
We diﬀerentiate between primary and higher levels of education (secondary and tertiary), and we
test whether quality aﬀects primary, secondary, and tertiary education in similar ways. Using
several measures of the quality of education for a broad number of countries (e.g., Barro and Lee,
2001; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2009; and the Shanghai Jiao Tong
University Academic Ranking), the empirical results reveal a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
of educational quality on attainment levels in secondary and tertiary education. Moreover, when
3In Erosa et al. (2010) and Manuelli and Seshadri (2007), educational quality is captured by the total aggregate
spending on education. Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that increasing the amount of resources spent does
not always translate into better learning among students (e.g., Hanushek, 1995). This issue motivates the inclusion
in our model of educational quality as a parameter that varies across countries and is exogenous to the individuals
deciding about higher education.
4Tamura’s (2001) theoretical analysis was one of the ﬁrst to include teacher quality in the production function of
human capital to study the importance of teacher quality versus class size for growth.
5For paper a studying how educational quality aﬀects dropout decisions, see Hanusek et al. (2008).
6Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2009) shows that when credit market imperfections are endogenized, poverty traps may be
avoided and intergenerational mobility may increase. On the other hand, papers that obtain multiple equilibria
without assuming credit market restrictions include Galor and Tsiddon (1997) and Castelló-Climent and Doménech
(2008).
4controlling for the stock of human capital, countries with better educational quality are those with
higher enrollment rates in secondary and tertiary education as well. Furthermore, consistent with
the fact that primary education is publicly provided and compulsory in most parts of the world,
the eﬀect of educational quality barely inﬂuences primary schooling. These results are not due to
omitted variable bias; they hold when controlling for the initial level of development, a measure of
current ﬁnancial development, years of compulsory education, and several time-invariant variables
that reﬂect cultural, geographical, and institutional characteristics of each country. Results are also
robust against outliers and are unlikely to be driven by reverse causation.
Finally, the predictions of our theory are tested on a broad sample of countries using regression
analysis rather than natural experiments and retrospective analysis in a particular country (e.g.,
Case and Deaton, 1999; Duﬂo, 2001; Hanushek et al., 2008). As far as we know, we are the ﬁrst
to take a macroeconomic perspective by testing the eﬀect of the quality of schooling on primary,
secondary, and tertiary schooling, and by using aggregate data on several countries at diﬀerent stages
of development to examine whether increases in the quality and quantity of education have the same
eﬀect at the initial levels of development as they do at later stages. Whereas Hanushek and Kimko
(2000) were the ﬁrst to highlight the importance of the quality of education in promoting economic
growth rates, the analysis in this paper goes one step further and shows that quality does not aﬀect
economic growth in countries at the bottom end of the quality distribution, yet better educational
quality has a clear positive inﬂuence on economic growth in the remaining economies. Moreover,
although both educational quality and investments in higher education are important determinants
of economic growth in developing countries, our results show a predominant eﬀect of quality of
education over investment rates in more developed economies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model under partial equilibrium. Section
3 analyzes the economy in a general equilibrium context. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
empirically analyzes the channels through which quality inﬂuences the quantity of schooling. Section
6 examines the link between education and growth, and Section 7 states the conclusions.
2 The Model
We study a model in which growth dynamics result from physical and human capital accumulation
in a context where the quality of the educational system is exogenous. Our economy consists of
one sequence of overlapping generations that live for two periods. Agents have primary education
that is compulsory and publicly provided. However, they can invest in higher education by spending
private resources, and there is a perfect capital market for human capital accumulation. In the
second period, agents work and earn an income consistent with their human capital investment.
52.1 Production
In every period, the economy produces a single homogeneous good that can be used for consumption






where ,  are quantities of physical and human capital (measured in eﬃciency units) and em-
ployed in production at time   is the capital-labor ratio, and  ∈ (01). The production function is
strictly monotone increasing and strictly concave, and satisﬁes the neoclassical boundary conditions
that ensure the existence of an interior solution to the producers’ proﬁt-maximization problem.7
Producers operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Given the wage rate per eﬃciency
unit of labor, and the rate of return to capital, in period  producers choose the level of employment
of capital  and the eﬃciency units of labor  so as to maximize proﬁts. The producers’ inverse




 = () − 0() =( 1− )
 
where  is the rate of return to capital and  is the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor. For
simplicity, we assume that capital depreciates fully,  =1  and thus +1 =1++1 −  = +1
2.2 Individuals
In every period, a generation consisting of a continuum of individuals of measure 1 is born. Each
individual has a single parent and a single child. Individuals are identical in preferences, within as
well as across generations, but they diﬀer in inherited wealth as well as in abilities. We denote ability
type as  with  = . Agents can be of a high ability type  which occurs with probability
1 −  or of a low ability  type, with probability 8
Agents live for two periods. In the ﬁrst period of their lives, individuals devote all of their time
to the acquisition of human capital, while in the second period agents supply their eﬃcient units
of education. Primary education is compulsory, such that every individual is assumed to have the
basic skills that are taught in primary school. Higher education requires private investments in
education instead. Thus, in the ﬁrst period of their lives, agents make decisions on whether or not
to acquire higher education, so that even in the absence of expenditures, all individuals acquire
primary education. Accordingly, our focus is on the evolution of secondary education, assuming that
universal basic literacy has already been met.
In the second period of their lives (adulthood), individuals supply their eﬃciency units of labor
and allocate the resulting wage income, along with their inheritance and capital income –the second
7For models where growth is also given by physical and human capital accumulation, see, for example, Galor and
Moav (2004) and Galor et al. (2009).
8Introducing ability as a continuous variable would not change the results qualitatively.
6period income 
+1– between consumption, 
+1 and bequests to their children, 
+1 where the
upper index  refers to the individual. The preferences of individual  are given by9

 =( 1− )ln
+1 +  ln
+1





Notice that by using ﬁrst order condition, a ﬁxed fraction  of total income is saved ∗
+1 = 
+1
and the remaining income is consumed ∗
+1 =( 1− )
+1 such that the indirect utility function
can be written as

 =l n ( 1− )1−

+1
2.3 Formation of human capital
If agents choose to invest in higher education, they need to decide what level of private expenditures
to make, which in our model is given by . Alternatively, we can introduce investment in time spent
on schooling in the production function of human capital. We have chosen the ﬁrst formulation to
stress that even with perfect capital markets, educational quality may play a crucial role in schooling
decisions.10 The production function for higher education is


+1 = ( + ) with  =  and 1 (3)
The human capital production function depends on the quality of the educational system, which
is exogenous and measured by  and on the level of ability .W h e n  =0  the acquired level
of human capital is primary schooling, 

+1 =  with  being an exogenous investment
in primary schooling made by the government. Talented individuals have larger total returns and
marginal returns on higher education than less talented ones. Although the marginal returns to
investment in higher schooling diminish with the real resources invested, rising school quality shifts
the marginal returns upward over all educational levels. Notice that there are increasing marginal
returns to quality and that the eﬀect of  on  is diﬀerent from its eﬀect on . This approach is
important to remain consistent with the empirical evidence showing that quality aﬀects education
decisions –see, for example, Hanushek et al. (2008) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2008).
Both secondary and tertiary education share the same human capital technology given by con-
dition (3). Due to this simple setup, diﬀerences between these two levels of schooling result from
diﬀerences in the investments in education, such that the higher  the higher the schooling level
attained.11
9This "joy-of-giving" altruism is the common form discussed in the literature on income distribution. It is supported
empirically by Altonji et al. (1997).
10If time were the input into the production of human capital, the qualitative results would not be aﬀected, as long
as the time invested in the formation of human capital increases with the capital-labor ratio.
11Using data from the OECD Education at a Glance (2009), we see that the correlations between public and
private expenditures on secondary and tertiary educational institutions as a percentage of GDP in the year 1995 and
enrollment rates in secondary and tertiary education are 0.516 and 0.575, respectively.
7The aggregate stock of eﬃciency units of human capital will be the sum of primary and higher
levels of education.
2.4 Investment decisions
We assume that capital markets are perfect. While this assumption is far from reality, we make it
to emphasize the role of the quality of the educational system. Its main implication is that when
agents decide to invest beyond primary education, everybody makes the optimal investment such
that the current gross interest rate equals the expected marginal product of human capital so as to
maximize expected income irrespective of one’s initial wealth.
In the presence of the log utility function and perfect capital markets, eﬃcient human capital ac-
cumulation decisions are those that maximize the lifetime income of the individual. Therefore, when
agents decide whether or not to invest in higher education, they solve the following maximization




+1 − +1( − 
)
We can ﬁnd a  low enough such that individuals optimally remain at the primary level, ∗
 =
012 Otherwise, the optimal interior solution,  equates the marginal return to physical capital and
human capital,
+1
2( + )−1 = +1 (4)
This FOC tells us that the optimal investment is given when the opportunity cost of investing in













Since the quality of the educational system positively aﬀects the returns on education, education
quality is a force that causes higher investment. We call this eﬀect the intensive channel;t h eh i g h e r
the quality, the higher the investment per person in higher schooling. In the next sections, we will
show that this eﬀect also holds under general equilibrium.13 The optimal level of higher education
is increasing with ability, such that talented individuals choose longer schooling.14 As expected, the
optimal investment is increasing with the wage rate and decreasing with the opportunity cost of the
educational investment. Note that, due to perfect capital markets, the optimal investment in higher
education is independent of inherited wealth.






13Berkowitz and Hoekstra (2011), using US data, show that high school quality matters because it increases the
possibility of going to more selective universities.
14Indeed, consistent with empirical evidence reported by Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Belley and Lochner
(2007), a positive relationship exists between cognitive ability and college attendance for all family income and wealth
levels in both the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (i.e., NLSY79) and NLSY97.
8Let’s deﬁne the threshold level of educational quality in which agents are indiﬀerent between











This threshold depends not on individuals’ inherited wealth, since capital markets are perfect, but
on their diﬀerences in ability. In particular, it decreases with ability since talented agents have more
incentives to invest in higher education. It is increasing in the opportunity cost of higher education
+1 so that an increase in the interest rate tightens the constraints on higher investment. If the
wage per eﬃciency unit of labor increases, the constraint on education loosens since, with higher
wages, the returns on investments in higher education are higher as well.
Equation (6) identiﬁes what we call the extensive channel.I ts t a t e st h a tw h e nq u a l i t yi sb e l o w
the threshold, educational quality becomes a barrier to entering higher education. By contrast, when
quality is above a threshold, individuals enter higher schooling. Indeed, for a given level of +1
+1  and  the composition of human capital depends on the quality of the school system in
the following way:
Regime I) If e  holds, that is, when the quality is relatively low, all agents receive primary
education.
Regime II) If e  ≤ e  holds, only talented agents invest in higher education, while low-
ability agents obtain primary schooling.
Regime III) If e  ≤  holds, that is, when the quality is high enough, all agents invest in higher
education.
Up to now, we have analyzed partial equilibrium, showing that quality is an important variable
explaining the human capital composition. This is the case because, ﬁrst, educational quality below
a threshold would imply that some agents would prefer to remain with primary education —the
extensive channel—, and second, better educational quality implies a higher level of investment per
person in higher education —the intensive channel. In what follows, we study the model when
performed in a general equilibrium setting.
3 General Equilibrium
In this section we will show that the results found under partial equilibrium are reinforced since as
the economy develops, higher output would entail a change in prices that provides incentives for
agents to invest in higher education.
3.1 The economy’s output accumulation path
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze the threshold level of educational quality under general equilibrium,
which allows us to distinguish the diﬀerent stages of development. And second, we show that in
every period, the economy, as an aggregate, is entirely characterized by the aggregate output per
worker or per capita,  Finally, we study its law of motion at each stage and along the process of
9development in order to understand the dynamic implications of the model for the composition of
human capital, output, and educational quality.
Let us ﬁnd the analytical solution under general equilibrium of the lower bound of the threshold
of quality –that is, e . From section 2.4, we know that if quality is relatively low, i.e., e 
holds, all agents receive primary education and the aggregate capital stock at  +1is as follows:
+1 =  = 
Since capital depreciates at rate  =1  the aggregate capital stock at +1comes from aggregate
savings, which are given by the aggregate level of bequest. The aggregate stock of human capital is
given by +1 = 

+1 +( 1− )





with  = +(1−) being the average ability and () the capital-labor ratio under Regime
 with  = . The capital-labor ratio +1 is increasing in  and decreasing in  Taking into
account this capital-labor ratio and equations (2) and (6), the threshold level of education quality





The upper bound of the threshold of quality is given by e 15 If e  holds, all agents
invest in higher education and thus, the aggregate capital stock is given by
+1 =  − ∗
 − (1 − )∗

The aggregate stock of human capital is
+1 = 

+1 +( 1− )

+1 = ( + ∗
) +( 1− )( + ∗
)







 )[1 + 
(1−)]1− = () (8)






 . Clearly, +1 is increasing in  and decreasing in  Considering this
capital-labor ratio and equations (2) and (6), the threshold level of education quality for low-ability
agents is
e  =







 (1 − )
 (9)
For a given  e   e  holds.16 The threshold level of education quality varies system-
atically with the level of development. Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the extensive channel as
15The subscript  on the threshold of quality is because the capital-labor ratio depends on 
16This is so because 





 1 always hold.
10a function of per capita output. In particular, it is decreasing with  since as output per capita
increases, the equilibrium prices change because the interest rate decreases and wages increase. As
a result, the constraints on quality are relaxed as the economy develops.
[  2]
The threshold level of per capita output is deﬁned by e (·)=( e )−1 with e  given by
equations (7) and (9)17 Figure 2 shows that educational quality is a crucial variable in determining
educational choices and thus human capital composition. Indeed, the following three regimes are
distinguished:
Regime I) e   e (or similarly   e   e ), with all agents having primary
education. The aggregate output per capita is given by
+1 =( )()1− (10)
The evolution of aggregate output per capita under Regime  can be deﬁned as +1 =  ()
with  = 
Regime II) e  ≤ e  (that is, e  ≤   e ), with only talented individuals with
higher education. The aggregate stock of physical capital is
+1 =  − ∗

We add across people using the population share in each education category to obtain an aggre-
gate measure of human capital
+1 = 

+1 +( 1− )

+1 =  +( 1− )( + ∗
)
The capital-labor ratio is
+1 =
 − (1 − )∗

 +( 1− )( + ∗
) (11)
Notice that ∗
 is strictly increasing in +1.E q u a t i o n (11) implicitly deﬁnes +1 = ( )
and using the implicit function theorem, the partial derivatives are +1  0  +1  0
The aggregate output per capita is given by
+1 =(  − (1 − )∗
)( +( 1− )( + ∗
))1−
or similarly as +1 =  ()
Regime III) e   e  ≤  (or similarly e   e  ≤ ) ,w h e r ea l la g e n t sh a v eh i g h e r
education and the aggregate output per capita is given by
+1 =(  − ∗
 − (1 − )∗
)(( + ∗
) +( 1− )( + ∗
))1− (12)
with +1 =  ()
17Notice that since educational quality is exogenous,  (·) is time independent.





 () if e  ≤ 
 () if e  ≤   e 
 () if   e 
(13)
The next proposition explains how educational quality aﬀects educational choices. It states that
educational quality aﬀects the access to higher education as well as how much investment to spend
on its acquisition. In section 5, the two channels will be tested.
Proposition 1. [The extensive and intensive channels under general equilibrium] Educational
quality aﬀects investment in higher education through two diﬀerent channels: higher quality increases
the access to higher education (extensive channel), and once individuals decide to participate in higher
education, higher educational quality increases the volume of investment made (intensive channel).
Proof. See Appendix.
In the next section, we discuss the most interesting equilibrium dynamic paths.
3.2 The dynamics of output per worker
The equilibrium dynamic path for output per worker will depend upon 0 the initial output per
worker, as well as on how the variables e  e  and  
  
  
 are related –with the steady
state denoted by the subscript . First, under Regime III all agents maximize income, and thus
output per worker is the highest. Therefore for any ,  
+1 
+1 and hence  
 
. Second,




and hence  
 
 
  Finally, from Figure 2, e   e  holds.
[  3]
Let us consider two of the most interesting dynamic paths of output per worker:
Case A: e  

The dynamics of Case A are depicted in Figure 3.W ea s s u m et h a ti n i t i a l l yt h e r ei sal o wl e v e lo f
output per worker, i.e., 0  e  so that the economy is in Regime I. At this stage of development,
the extensive channel is at work, and agents optimally attend only primary education. As capital
accumulates, and due to the general equilibrium price eﬀect, the economy enters into Regime II, in
which only the more intelligent agents invest in higher education. However, for low ability agents,
the educational quality constraint remains binding and they stay with primary schooling instead.
Along the transition from Regime I to Regime II, the output per capita is pushed onto a higher
dynamic path.18 Economic growth increases the returns from investing in higher education relative
to physical capital, raising the opportunities for less talented individuals to pursue education beyond
the primary level. The economy enters Regime III where everyone makes the optimal investment,
and the current gross interest rate equals the expected marginal product of higher education. As
18The large discrete jump in output per capita is due to the assumptions of perfect capital markets and ability only
taking two values. Relaxing both hypotheses would allow us to have a more gradual movement to a higher path.
12a result, the economy is at the maximum possible income level in the steady state. At this last
stage of development, an exogenous increase in educational quality induces agents to invest further
in higher education due to the intensive channel.
In summary, Figure 3 shows the interdependence among economic growth, the distribution of
educational attainment, and the quality of the educational system. As we move along the three
development paths, output per worker increases, which in turn, due to general equilibrium eﬀects,
increases the future output per worker and changes the equilibrium prices. Speciﬁcally, higher
output per worker increases the wage per eﬃcient unit and decreases the interest rate (see equation
2), inducing agents to acquire higher education. Consequently, as output increases, more people can
enter higher education –the constraint on quality is relaxed, as can be seen from Figure 2–a n d
once agents decide to invest in higher education, the investment per person also increases. Both
eﬀects end up fostering the accumulation of human capital.19
The next paragraph summarizes the equilibrium and some of its properties. Proposition 2 says
that under Case A, the steady state is unique. The second part of the proposition brieﬂye x a m i n e s
the eﬀect of changes in the quality of education. It is of particular interest, since varying quality
corresponds to changing the technology for producing human capital. It shows that education
quality inﬂuences transitional dynamics. Indeed, controlling for initial income, educational quality
is positively associated with growth because countries with higher quality are further from the steady
state, and thus, grow faster. Consequently, if educational quality increases, the growth rate of output
per worker increases and output per worker increases in all subsequent periods.
Proposition 2: [The steady state and educational quality under transitional dynamics] If ag-
gregate output per worker is given by the law of motion in equation (13), and if e  
 holds,
 
 is the unique steady state equilibrium. Moreover, along the transition from below, countries
with a better educational quality will experience more growth.
Proof. See Appendix.
The evolution of output per capita or per worker, +1 =  () is given by expression (12)

















 0 for any a with j = HL
The ﬁrst term, which is strictly positive, is called the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of quality on output. The
second term is the indirect eﬀect of educational quality on output through the level of investment. It
cancels out because ∗
 =a r gm a x 




 =0 .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
the following corollary provides the ﬁrst glimpse of the role of educational quality and quantity as
potential determinants of the dynamics of output per worker. It states that, under Regime III,
educational quality matters more than educational quantity in explaining the evolution of output
per capita.
19The "jump" in Figure 3 can be interpreted as the experiences of countries like South Korea and Taiwan in the
1940s, which were making enormous initial investments in education to implement sweeping educational reforms,
and both countries moved to a higher steady state thereafter. We want to thank an anonymous referee for this
interpretation.
13Corollary 1: Under Regime III when all agents are investing optimally in human capital, the
dynamics of output per worker is driven by educational quality and not by quantity of schooling.
Proof. See Appendix.
Clearly, we will expect that cross country data show that in developed countries, where fewer
agents are credit constrained and more agents would invest optimally –compared with poor coun-
tries, only quality would raise the rate of growth of output per worker. By contrast, in less developed
countries, we would expect that both variables matter for growth. The implications of both Propo-
sition 2 and Corollary 1 will be tested in Section 6.
Case B:  
  e  
  e 
We assume that the initial output per worker 0 is below  
 Since  
  e  holds, the economy
converges to the low stable steady state  
 where agents only have primary education. For any
level of output between the thresholds e  and e  the economy converges to  
 .A n d f o r a n y
level of output above e  the economy converges to the highest stable steady state under Regime
III,  
 
It is interesting to analyze the conditions under which the country can remain stuck at the
low steady state where agents only have primary education. This may occur when the marginal
propensity to save is low, since  
 is increasing with  and e  is decreasing instead. In our model,
more education is given by transforming physical capital into human capital. Therefore, economies
with a low savings rate will accumulate less physical capital and thus per capita output at a lower
rate. Similarly, when  is very low, it could trap the economy at a low level of development since,
with an initially very low quality of the educational system, the extensive channel becomes eﬀective,
so that e  will be relatively high and  
 will be relatively low.
4D a t a
The predictions of our theoretical model regarding the inﬂuence of schooling quality on the quantity
invested in education and its inﬂuence on the process of development are analyzed empirically for
a broad sample of countries. One of the main drawbacks in this regard is that quality of schooling
is diﬃcult to measure, and data on educational quality across countries are scarce. The existing
data on educational quality for a broad sample of countries comes from two main sources. The ﬁrst
includes measures of schooling inputs, such as expenditures per student, teacher-pupil ratio, and
teachers’ salaries, among others. The second refers to direct measures of output or cognitive skills.
In this paper, we use the second since it directly measures the knowledge acquired while in school.
In fact, several papers conclude that more resources spent in school do not always improve students’
performance (see, e.g., Hanushek, 1995).
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) is the ﬁrst attempt to compile measures of the quality of schooling
across countries based on students’ cognitive performance in various international tests of academic
achievement in math and science. By combining all available information, these authors computed
a single measure for 90 countries averaged over the period 1960-1991.20 Hanushek and Woessmann
20Originally, only 39 countries participated in international tests of academic achievement. The authors extended
14(2009) extend previous measures to improve direct comparisons of student knowledge over time,
across tests, and across age groups. The new data comprises 77 countries, and observations are
updated up to 2003. However, in spite of its improvement in comparability terms, for many of the
countries, there are no available data on per capita GDP for the period 1960-2004. As a result,
when using Hanushek and Woessman (2009) with other data sets, the number of observations in
the sample is reduced considerably. Panel data are available in Barro and Lee (2001), who compile
scores on examinations in science, mathematics, and reading for students of diﬀerent age groups in
various years for 58 countries. Finally, we use the Shanghai Jiao Tong University Academic Ranking
of World Universities. The measure aggregates six diﬀerent indicators of research performance at
the university level, such as alumni and staﬀ winning Nobel prizes, highly cited researchers, and
articles indexed in major citation indices.21
Data on the quantity of education are taken from two diﬀerent sources. As a measure of the
stock of human capital, we use the share of individuals with a given level of schooling, proxied by
data on the share of population aged 25 and above for whom primary, secondary, and tertiary is the
highest level of school attained. The source is the latest Barro and Lee (2010) data set available from
1950 to 2010. The investment in education is proxied by enrollment rates in primary, secondary, and
tertiary education, taken from Barro and Lee (1994) and updated with UNESCO data. The time
span for enrollment rates is from 1960 to 2008.
To avoid the results being biased by omitted variables, we control for an array of measures that
could inﬂuence the decisions of individuals to invest in higher education as well as other variables
that are related to both the quantity and quality of schooling. Next we deﬁne the additional controls,
and in the next section we discuss in detail why these variables should be included in the analysis.
We control for the degree of credit market imperfection. Following the literature (e.g., Iyigun and
Owen 2004), we measure credit market restrictions through the private credit provided by deposit
money banks divided by GDP, taken from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2010). Although the variable
of ﬁnancial development () does not measure the imperfections in credit markets directly, we
expect there to be fewer problems obtaining credit when the ﬁnancial system is more developed.
To control for the number of years that are compulsory at the secondary level (   ), we
take data on duration of compulsory education from UNESCO.22 The cultural characteristics are
proxied by the share of the population professing a religion (taken from La Porta et al. 1999),
the number of school days per year (Barro and Lee 2001), and a dummy for East Asian countries.
Political institutions are proxied by a dummy for democratic countries (), taken from
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). Geographical characteristics are measured with a dummy for
countries located in tropical areas (), taken from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002). Finally, as
these measures to other countries by imputing missing values from international test score regressions. We use the
quality variable QL2 taken from Table C-1 in Hanushek and Kimko (2000).
21To control for scale eﬀects, we use the methodology suggested by Aghion et al. (2007, 2009), which transforms
the original index into a measure that takes the country’s population into account and that can be interpreted as a
fraction of the US per capita performance.
22The main drawback of the data on years of compulsory education is that they are available only from 2000
onwards.
15additional controls, we add public spending on education as a share of GDP (), taken from
the World Development Indicators and Barro and Lee (1994), and the share of total population
living in urban areas (), from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002).
For the estimation of the growth equation, we use data on real per capita GDP (), the physical
capital investment rate (), the government share of real GDP (), and exports plus
imports divided by real GDP (), all taken from the PWT 6.2. Finally, the inﬂation rate
(), measured as the annual growth rate of consumer prices, is taken from Easterly and
Sewadeh (2002).
5 Channels through which quality inﬂuences quantity
5.1 Hypothesis to be tested
Extensive channel [H1]: In countries where educational quality is higher, the stock of people with
secondary schooling will be larger.
A cross-country implication of the extensive channel states in Proposition 1 is that, as the number
of people with higher education will be inﬂuenced by the quality of the educational system, we expect
that, other things being equal, those countries with a better quality of education will have a larger
proportion of individuals with secondary schooling. The empirical strategy to test this hypothesis
will be the following:
 = 0+1
−+2 ln−+3−+4    −+4−+ (14)
where Educationi, t is measured as the share of population 25 years and above with secondary and
tertiary education as the highest level of school attained,  stands for the country, and  for the
time. To minimize reverse causation, all explanatory variables are lagged  periods. According to
our theory, the quantity of higher education is determined by educational quality, as well as by the
equilibrium prices, which in turn depend on the aggregate level of per capita output. To avoid that
the coeﬃcient of quality is also picking up the general equilibrium eﬀect, we control for the initial
level of per capita income (ln). Likewise, the speciﬁcation also includes an array of additional
controls to address any bias caused by omitted variables. We expect 1  0 since the higher the
quality of education (), the higher the number of individuals with secondary schooling will
be.
Intensive channel [H2]: Once individuals have decided to invest in higher education, a better-
quality educational system will imply a higher investment in schooling.
Proposition 1 shows that once people decide to enter higher education, education quality is a force
that increases their investment in education. Thus, higher quality implies higher investment when the
quality of education is above a threshold level. We check for a diﬀerential eﬀect of low and higher
educational quality by interacting the quality measure with low- and high-quality dummies, i.e.,
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 stands for the accumulation of higher education. Using the enrollment rates as the dependent
variable and controlling for the initial stock of secondary education (), we should ﬁnd no
relation between quality and education investment when quality is very low and a positive eﬀect
of quality on the human capital investment rate when quality is suﬁcently high. Thus, we expect
1 ≈ 0 and 2  0.
I th a sb e e nc o m m o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r et od i ﬀerentiate between the ﬂow of human capital, or its
accumulation, proxied by enrollment rates, and the stock of human capital, which has usually been
measured by years of schooling.24 We follow Mankiw et al. (1992) and Lorentzen et al. (2008) and
use secondary school enrollment rates as a proxy for human capital investment. Although enrollment
rates is an imperfect measure of how long a typical student stays in school, since it does not take
dropouts into account, we would expect enrollment rates to be higher when people spend more time
in school. We test the robustness of the results with a measure of the average years of secondary
and tertiary schooling.
5.2 Empirical results
In order to correct for potential endogeneity bias, we measure the explanatory variables lagged several
years. Speciﬁcally, given that the variable on educational quality is available as an average over the
period 1964-1991,25 we split the whole sample into two sub-periods and measure the explanatory
variables from 1960 to 1990, and the dependent variable from 1990 to 2010, so that there is no direct
simultaneity in the speciﬁcation. Table 1 displays the results for the extensive channel –that is
H1— in columns (1-6) and those for the intensive channel –that is H2— in columns (7-10).
Controlling for the initial level of development, the results in column (1) show that a higher-
quality educational system has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the subsequent at-
tainment levels in secondary schooling. The estimated coeﬃcient suggests that an increase in one
standard deviation in the quality indicator (11.9) increases attainment levels in secondary schooling
by 6 percent. This eﬀect is not the result of atypical observations. Column (2) includes dummy
variables that control for outliers, and the estimated coeﬃcient of the quality of schooling does not
23The low-quality dummy is equal to one if the value of quality is lower than the mean of the high income OECD
countries minus two times its standard deviation, and zero otherwise. The dummy of high-quality countries is equal
to one if the quality value is higher than this threshold level, and zero otherwise.
24A clear example of this diﬀerence is the method followed by Barro and Lee (2001, 2010) to compute attainment
levels and years of schooling. Overall, the procedure consists of using enrollment data, with appropiate lags, to
measure the new entrants as ﬂows that add to the stock of education.
25We use Hanushek and Kimko’s (2000) data since it contains a greater number of countries. Nevertheless, we will
show that the results are robust to alternative measures of educational quality.
17change.26 Moreover, the importance of the quality aspect of education is also reﬂected in its ex-
planatory power, since the initial level of development and the quality of schooling explain about 60
percent of the variation across countries in secondary schooling attainment levels.
Whereas our model suggests that causality goes from quality to quantity of education, it is
possible that a society’s level of development and education inﬂuence the resources devoted to
schools and the production of human capital. In fact, more developed and educated societies may
demand a higher-quality educational system. Hence, governments cannot directly aﬀect outcomes,
but they can increase the resources spent on education or promote policies that improve the quality
of schooling. For example, governments may respond to these demands by providing more computers
and schooling materials, by increasing the number of teachers, by increasing teachers’ salaries and
so on. Thus, we control for the share of public spending on education, which comprises all of the
aforementioned items. Moreover, since access to school and skilled jobs may be easier to obtain in
urban areas than in rural ones, we also control for the share of population living in urban areas.
The results, displayed in column (3), show that higher spending on education and a greater share
of population living in urban areas are related to higher attainment levels in secondary education.
However, even when controlling for all of these variables, the positive, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
of educational quality on attainment levels in secondary schooling still holds.27
I tm a ya l s ob ep o s s i b l et h a tc o u n t r i e sw i t hah i g h e r-quality educational system are also those in
which governments ascribe high importance to education. Thus, it could be that instead of quality,
we are picking up the higher number of years of compulsory secondary education in these countries.
To rule out this possibility, in column (4) we control for the number of years of education that are
compulsory at the secondary level. The estimated coeﬃcient of this variable is positive, although
not statistically signiﬁcant at the standard levels. Nevertheless, our results show that controlling for
this variable does not change the coeﬃcient and signiﬁcance of the measure of quality of schooling.
Results do not change either if we control for a proxy of restrictions in the credit market, which has
been the channel analyzed most frequently in the literature to explain underinvestments in education.
Column (5) shows that economies with a better ﬁnancial system also have higher attainment levels
in secondary education. However, controlling for a proxy of credit constraints does not change the
positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the quality of schooling.
Finally, to proxy for ﬁxed eﬀects, we directly control for speciﬁc country characteristics, such as
cultural, political, and geographical factors that may inﬂuence both the quality and the quantity of
schooling. In fact, cultural and religious features may aﬀect individuals’ values and attitudes toward
education. For example, Guiso et al. (2003) ﬁnd that religious beliefs are associated with economic
attitudes. Thus, to account for cultural values, we control for the share of population professing
Muslim, Catholic, or Protestant religious beliefs; an East Asian dummy, since the high value that
people in East Asian countries place on education may explain why these economies score high
26Countries whose residuals exceed the estimated standard error of the residuals by more than two times include
Ghana and Sri Lanka with a positive value and New Zealand with a negative one.
27The results do not change if we control for other inputs determined by the government that directly aﬀect
secondary schooling, such as the pupil-teacher ratio in secondary school and the share of government educational
expenditures per pupil at the secondary level, taken from Barro and Lee (2001).
18on international tests and have higher levels of schooling than other countries with similar levels of
development; and the number of school days per year in primary school, since this can also reﬂect the
importance society ascribes to education.28 Political institutions and geographical characteristics
are controlled for through a dummy for democratic countries and a dummy for countries in tropical
regions.29 Our results, displayed in column (6), show that Muslim countries, on average, have lower
attainment levels than countries in which the majority of the population profess a diﬀerent religion.
Our results also show that whereas democratic countries have a larger share of the population with
secondary schooling, being located in tropical areas seems to discourage educational attainment.
Nevertheless, controlling for all of these speciﬁc country characteristics does not change the positive
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect that the quality of education has on the number of individuals who
attain higher levels of education.
Overall, our results show a quite robust and positive eﬀect of the quality of education on the
subsequent proportion of the population with secondary schooling. Next, we test whether once
individuals decide to enter higher education, a higher-quality educational system implies higher
investment rates as well. Results for the intensive channel are displayed in columns (7-10), where
the educational investment rates are proxied through enrollment rates in secondary schooling. The
ﬁndings reveal that even when controlling for the stock of human capital, a higher-quality educational
system is associated with higher investment rates in secondary schooling; the coeﬃcient of the
quality indicator is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. However, as stated
by proposition 1, we should expect the quality of education to have a positive eﬀect on the human
capital investment rates only when quality is above a threshold level. In line with the predictions
of the model, column (10) shows that when quality is very low, the estimated coeﬃcient of quality
is close to zero, whereas when quality is suﬃciently high, results display a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of quality on the human capital investment rate.
5.3 Robustness of the results
Alternative measures of the quality of education. In Table 2, we test the robustness of H1
and H2 with alternative measures of the quality of schooling. In the ﬁrst place we use Barro and
Lee’s (2001) data set, which includes observations of test scores for diﬀerent years. By exploiting
the temporal dimension of the data, we can estimate a pool with explanatory variables lagged ﬁve
years and thereby minimize endogeneity concerns. However, this comes at the cost of reducing the
number of countries by almost half.30 The results displayed in the upper part of Table 2 show that
using Barro and Lee’s (2001) data set produces similar results to those found for a broader set of
28This variable, taken from Barro and Lee (2001), is not available for higher levels of schooling. A more informative
variable might be the number of school hours per year. However, information on this measure is only restricted to a
small number of countries.
29Sachs and Warner (1997) ﬁnd that being located in tropical areas is a geographical disadvantage for development.
30The results refer to test scores in science, for which there are a few more observations available than for test scores
in math. Nevertheless, the results do not change with math scores. The use of math and science and not the reading
scores is based on the idea that research activities and the creation of new ideas are important sources of growth (e.g.,
Romer, 1990).
19countries with cross-sectional data.
The results also hold with the measure of quality updated by Hanushek and Woessmann (2009),
which is a clear improvement in terms of comparability over time, across tests, and across student age
groups. However, it also comes at the cost of reducing the sample to only 45 countries. The results,
displayed in Panel B, also show a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of a better quality of education on the
share of individuals with secondary schooling. Likewise, once controlling for the stock of secondary
education, higher quality also boosts the investment rates in education, as reﬂected by the higher
enrollment rates. However, the results do not display any diﬀerential eﬀect in the countries with low
and high quality of schooling. A plausible explanation could be the reduced number of countries
and the large representation of high income economies in the sample.
Since Hanushek and Woessmann’s (2009) data on quality are computed as an average up to the
year 2003, it is more diﬃcult to control for endogeneity in this scenario. In the bottom part of Table
2 we follow an instrumental variable approach and use the measure of Hanushek and Kimko (2000),
averaged over the period 1960-1990, as an instrument for the quality measure of Hanushek and
Woessmann (2009). The proposed instrument appears to be a good candidate for several reasons.
First, the correlation among both variables is high (0.71). Second, the quality variable of Hanushek
and Kimko (2000) should not inﬂuence attainment levels or enrollment rates directly, except as
an instrument for the quality of education. Finally, the high value of the F-test in the ﬁrst-stage
regression suggests the instrument is not weak. Nevertheless, the instrument is unlikely to truly be
a source of exogenous variation and, given that the model is just identiﬁed, we cannot properly test
whether the instrument is exogenous. Thus, results should be interpreted with caution since the
potential endogeneity of quality to other unmeasured determinants of increased schooling suggests
that the quantitative eﬀect of quality could be biased upwards. This approach, however, could
correct for potential measurement error bias in the measure of quality.31 Findings reveal that the
positive eﬀect of the quality of education on the quantity of schooling continues to be positive and
signiﬁcant. In fact, the estimated coeﬃcient of quality is now higher than its OLS counterpart in
Panel B, suggesting that the instrumental variable approach could be correcting the attenuation bias
caused by measurement error. Nevertheless, in quantitative terms the impact on attainment levels
is similar to that found in Table 1. According to column (1), a one standard deviation increase in
the quality of schooling (0.592) increases the secondary attainment levels by 5 percent.32
Alternative measures of the quantity of education. The measure of investment in educa-
tion refers to students enrolled in school at a particular grade or age in period . The advantage
of this measure is that it is very unlikely that students enrolled in period  may determine the test
31To reduce attenuation bias caused by measurement error, Pritchett (2001) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001) use
a former measure of years of schooling by Nehru et al. (1995) and Kyriacou (1991), respectively, as an instrument
for an updated measure of years of schooling by Barro and Lee (2001). Schoellman (forthcoming) uses test scores by
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Hanushek and Woessman (2009) as an instrument for educational quality, measured
by estimated returns to schooling of foreign-educated immigrants in the United States.
32Whereas the F-statistic in the ﬁrst stage is above 10 in almost all speciﬁcations and, therefore, it is an indication
that the instrument is not weak, the low value of the F-statistic in column (10) suggests that the low and high quality
measures, computed with Hanushek and Kimko’s (2000) data, are weak instruments for the low and high quality
measures computed with Hanushek and Woessmann’s (2009) data.
20scores of students enrolled − years back. Likewise, we test whether the results with the measure
of attainment levels, which refer to the population 25 years and above, are inﬂuenced by the oldest
generations. In Panel A of Table 3, we check H1 with a measure of secondary attainment levels of
the population 25-39 years old. Results are very similar to those with the total population, suggest-
ing that previous ﬁndings are not inﬂuenced by the oldest cohorts. On the other hand, in columns
(7-10) we use the average years of education in secondary and tertiary schooling as an alternative
measure for the investment rates.33 In line with the results in Table 1, ﬁndings reveal a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the quality of education on the average years of schooling
as well. Moreover, the positive eﬀect of quality is mainly found when the quality of education is
suﬃciently high (column (10)).
In Section 2 we model higher levels of education in a reduced form, since the human capital
production function is similar for secondary and tertiary education. However, in Table 3 we check
that the extensive and intensive channels, H1 and H2, also hold at the university level. We proxy
the quality of tertiary education with international rankings of the performance of the top 500
universities in year 2003, taken from the Shanghai Jiao Tong University Academic Ranking.34
Panel B of Table 3 shows the results of the eﬀect of university quality on attainment levels
and enrollment rates in tertiary education. Column (1) shows that higher per capita income is
positively and signiﬁcantly related to higher attainment levels in tertiary education. Moreover, even
controlling for the level of development, countries with a higher number of universities in the top
500 also have a higher share of the population with university education. In quantitative terms, the
eﬀect implies that an increase of one standard deviation in the quality indicator (0.44) is associated
with an increase of 2.6 percent in attainment levels in tertiary education. Furthermore, column (9)
shows that once individuals decide to enter tertiary education, the higher the quality, the higher the
investment rates as well.
In our model, we assume that the primary level of education is publicly provided by the govern-
ment and that individuals’ decisions to invest in education mainly refer to higher schooling. The
reason is that in most countries, primary education is compulsory and ﬁnanced by the government.
In fact, according to UNESCO data, in the year 2000, primary education was compulsory in every
country in the world. Therefore, we would expect that any eﬀect of higher-quality education on
the quantity of education should be stronger in secondary and tertiary education than in primary
education. Certainly, using the measure of quality of education from Hanushek and Kimko (2000),
the lower part of Table 3 shows no eﬀect of the quality of education on the share of individuals with
33We have measured investment rates as the cumulative years of education in secondary and tertiary schooling.
When the dependent variable is the average years of schooling in secondary education or the total average years of
education of the population 25-39 years old, the estimated coeﬃcient of quality is 0.038 (st.err.: 0.012) and 0.033
(st.err.: 0.015), respectively.
34The quality of secondary education is not always related to quality at the tertiary level. For instance, according
to the international test scores compiled by Hanushek and Kimko (2000), the quality of secondary education in the
United States is lower than that in other countries with similar or lower levels of development (see Figure 1). However,
when it comes to tertiary education, American universities are by far the best in the world. The correlation of the
quality measure from Hanushek and Kimko (2000) with the transformed measure of university performance is 0.570
for the top 500 institutions.
21primary education and the investment rates in primary schooling; the coeﬃcient of the quality of
education is close to zero in almost all speciﬁcations.
6E d u c a t i o n a n d g r o w t h
6.1 Hypothesis to be tested
Eﬀect of the quality of education on the process of development [H3]:T h eh i g h e rt h e
educational quality, the higher the rate of growth.
Proposition 2 shows that educational quality is positively associated with output growth since
the country is further from its steady state. Our identiﬁcation strategy will be to diﬀerentiate among





 +3 ln− +4− +
(16)
where ∆ln is the growth rate of per capita income and the explanatory variables include initial per
capita income (ln−), to control for conditional convergence, and other standard determinants of
growth (−). We would expect a negligible eﬀect on growth when quality is below a threshold
level, that is, 1 ≈ 0, and a positive eﬀect when quality is above that level, 2  0.
Eﬀect of quality and quantity of education on development [H4]: Investment in higher
education will be relatively more important than educational quality in explaining growth when the
country is further from its steady state.
In our theory, the eﬀect of quality on output is driven by two diﬀerentiated eﬀects; in addition
to the indirect eﬀect of increasing the incentives to invest in higher education, quality is good in
itself –a direct eﬀect– because it reveals the degree of eﬀectiveness of accumulating human capital.
Corollary 1 shows that when all agents choose investment optimally, that is, under the highest
regime, the indirect eﬀect disappears because when the economy is in its steady state the level
of investment is maximized. A cross-country implication of this corollary is that if both quality
and investment are introduced in a growth regression, we would expect that investment matters
only if the economy is poor and far away from its steady state. That is, we expect that in these
countries, due to several constraints on education, investment in higher schooling is not going to
be optimal. This hypothesis is diﬃcult to test since knowing whether a country is at its steady
state is not straightforward. Nevertheless, as an approximation, we assume that rich countries are
more likely to be closer to their steady state than poorer economies. We test H4 by interacting











We should expect a positive eﬀect of the quality of education on growth (3  0). However,
the eﬀect of the investment rate should be higher in those countries that are further to their steady
states, 1  0 and 2 ≈ 0.
6.2 Empirical results
We test H3 and H4 in Table 4, in which the average growth rate of per capita income for the period
1960-2004 is regressed on the initial per capita income, to reﬂect convergence in incomes across
countries, and other standard determinants of growth, such as the physical capital investment share,
the public spending share, the imports plus the exports divided by GDP, and the inﬂation rate. We
use Hanushek and Kimko’s (2000) data on the quality of education since the variable is available
for a broad number of countries, including those with low and high educational quality, as well as
t h o s ew i t hv e r yl o wa n dv e r yh i g hi n c o m el e v e l s .T h erefore, we estimate a cross-sectional equation
by OLS.36
Column (1) in the upper part of the table shows a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
of the quality indicator, suggesting that, other things being equal, countries with a better-quality
educational system have experienced, on average, higher growth rates in per capita income. However,
according to H3, the positive eﬀect of the quality of education on the growth of income should be
observed only when the quality of education is above a threshold level. Certainly, when we split the
quality eﬀect between low- and high-quality countries, our results show that whereas the estimated
coeﬃcient of the quality of education is not signiﬁcant in countries with quality at the bottom end
of the distribution, higher-quality educational systems have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect in most of the economies (column (2)).
On the other hand, column (3) shows that higher enrollment rates are positively and statistically
signiﬁcantly related to higher growth rates in per capita income. However, in line with hypothesis
H4, the eﬀect is stronger in economies that were relatively poor than in countries with per capita
i n c o m e si nt h et o p2 5 th percentile of the income distribution. Results displayed in columns (4) and
(5) show that, although the coeﬃcients of the interaction terms are both statistically signiﬁcant, the
quantitative eﬀect of higher enrollment rates on growth is almost double in lower income countries
than in the richest economies.
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) are the ﬁrst to show that once the quality of education is taken
35
 is equal to one if real GDP in 1960 is lower than the 75th percentile of the income distribution in that
year and zero otherwise. Likewise, 
 is equal to one if real GDP per capita in 1960 is within the top 25th
percentile of the income distribution, and zero otherwise.
36Using Barro and Lee’s (2001) data set on quality measures, we have also tried to estimate a dynamic panel data
model that controls for country-speciﬁce ﬀects with the system GMM estimator. However, even using a low number
of lags in the set of instruments, the reduced number of observations makes this estimator less reliable, as reﬂected
by the speciﬁcation tests.
23into account, the eﬀect of the average years of schooling in an otherwise standard growth equation
vanishes. In the lower part of Table 4 we test the robustness of the previous results, taking Hanushek
and Kimko (2000) as a benchmark. Columns (1) and (2) display results similar to those found by
Hanushek and Kimko (2000); that is, the positive coeﬃcient of the average years of schooling (column
1)) disappears once a measure of the quality of education is included in the set of controls (column
2)). Nevertheless, in line with the predictions of our model, column (3) shows that the positive eﬀect
of quality on growth is found only when quality is relatively high, which leads to the suggestion that
quality is not growth enhancing unless students achieve a minimum level of knowledge. On the
other hand, when including the eﬀect of quality and quantity together, whereas the inﬂuence of
quantity disappears in high-income countries, we still ﬁnd a positive inﬂuence of quantity on growth
in lower-income economies.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
So far, most of the theoretical and empirical literature on human capital and development has
focused mainly on the quantity of schooling. This paper reconsiders the role of human capital by
emphasizing the importance of the qualitative aspects of education and their eﬀect on schooling
decisions about higher education. Our proposed theory implies that, when primary schooling is
compulsory and publicly provided, educational quality may aﬀect economic growth by increasing
the extensiveness –expanding access to more agents– as well as the intensiveness –increasing the
investment made by each agent–of the accumulation of human capital beyond primary education.
Our results further suggest that educational quality plays a central role in the composition of human
capital and in the long-run level of income. Using cross-country data, we ﬁnd evidence supporting
these predictions of the theory.
From this paper, we can derive some interesting policy implications. First, when seeking to
promote human capital formation, policy makers usually focus on expanding access to education,
while paradoxically forgetting the qualitative aspects. According to this paper, working to improve
educational quality could be an extremely powerful and eﬀective policy approach.37 Second, the
achievement of quality in higher education remains a major challenge in the developing world, and
tackling shortcomings in educational quality requires a long-term perspective, implying changes in
educational institutions, laws, and policies. A possible short-term solution for local communities
could be to promote programs in which prestigious foreign educational institutions open branches in
developing countries that have a growing demand for higher education but lack educational systems
of adequately high quality. Renowned universities and higher educational institutions operating
beyond their own borders could help such developing countries to increase human capital formation
and work their way out of poverty.
37We are not claiming that extending educational opportunities to a larger portion of the population is not a
legitimate policy aim in and of itself. Rather, we are emphasizing the importance of the quality of the educational
system.
24A logical extension of this work would be to analyze the determinants of educational quality.38
In this context, it would be interesting to analyze the policy implications of increasing educational
quality in detail. This would be crucial if the goal is to identify ways to stimulate development
in poor economies. In sum, there appears to exist enormous potential for researchers and policy
makers to focus on the qualitative aspects of education, and with this paper, we are only scratching
the surface.
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9A p p e n d i x
Proof of Proposition 1: The extensive channel follows from equations (7) and (9) and Figure 2.
The intensive channel by contrast appears under Regimes II and III. Under Regime III, the
investment in higher education among high and low ability individuals is given by ∗
+(1−)∗












 with  =  (18)
such that the following expression is obtained: ∗








 Clearly, it is
increasing in  and therefore the larger the quality, the larger the investment in higher education.
If the economy is under Regime II, only high ability individuals invest in higher schooling and
+1 is implicitly given by equation (11). One way to have a close solution for 
+1 is to study what
27happens if  → 0 In this special case, everyone is a high ability individual and invests in higher
education,39 and 
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(1−)]1− (19)




  0 always holds.
QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : If e   
 holds, the following order of the parameters e  
e   
  
  
 holds too, so that the only possible equilibrium is under Regime III.
We will show that the law of motion of  






Substituting conditions (8) and (5) into the law of motion of  
+1 –given by equation (12)–
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 =0  because +(1−)
1
Equation (20) can be rewritten as:
Y 
+1=( Y +)
+(1−)( +( 1 − ))
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P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 :Under Regime III output per worker is given by equation (12), which in




  We know that ∗
 =a r gm a x 
+1 for any  with  =














 )−1} =0 
That is, by using equation (2), the expression above can be rewritten as +1 = +1
2( +
∗
 )−1 As condition 4 shows us, this is the FOC of the optimal level of investment in higher
education.
QED.
39It does not make sense to study what happens if  → 1 since then everybody is low ability and thus, ∗
 =0 
28 
                               Figure 2: The evolution of the thresholds 
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Dependent variable: Education at the secondary level
H1 H2
Attainment level (EducationSEC





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
QualityHK
60−90 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.007









lny60 0.064 0.086 0.007 0.005 0.031 -0.016 0.222 0.219 0.201 0.178
(0.022) (0.020) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028)
+ 0.350 0.264 0.259 0.295 0.266 0.345 0.342 0.301
(0.063) (0.037) (0.044) (0.040) (0.033) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036)
− -0.313 -0.275 -0.277 -0.264 0.264 -0.354 -0.335 -0.283




PSEduc60−90 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.034
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
lnurb60−90 0.094 0.093 0.087 0.102
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020)


















Constant -0.385 -0.590 -0.367 -0.355 -0.479 -0.336 -1.382 -1.384 -1.232 -0.835
(0.167) (0.129) (0.139) (0.158) (0.159) (0.185) (0.197) (0.197) (0.225) (0.235)
R2 0.428 0.603 0.677 0.677 0.698 0.783 0.719 0.754 0.762 0.790
Countries 72 72 66 66 63 63 71 71 71 71
Note: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c stand for signiﬁcance level at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.
Dependent variable is the share of population 25 years and above with secondary education (columns 1-6) and enrollment rates in secondary
education (columns 7-10).Table 2
Dependent variable: Education at the secondary level
H1 H2
Attainment level (EducationSEC





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A- Measure of quality: Barro and Lee (2001), pooled OLS
QualityBL
−5 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.006









lnyt−5 0.089 0.103 0.042 0.042 0.058 0.057 0.183 0.178 0.166 0.166
(0.027) (0.025) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.044) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027)
R2 0.392 0.485 0.548 0.564 0.608 0.681 0.655 0.792 0.795 0.795
C o u n t r i e s 4 04 0 3 7 3 7 3 53 5 4 04 0 4 0 4 0
Obs. 84 84 73 73 68 68 80 80 80 80
B- Measure of quality: Hanushek and Woessmann (2009), OLS
QualityHW
64−03 0.052 0.061 0.072 0.072 0.056 0.088 0.089 0.071 0.073









lny60 0.036 0.061 0.004 -0.002 0.013 0.013 0.162 0.149 0.157 0.152
(0.027) (0.029) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.058) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
R2 0.192 0.403 0.503 0.522 0.622 0.670 0.637 0.785 0.788 0.792
C o u n t r i e s 4 54 5 4 3 4 3 4 14 1 4 44 4 4 4 4 4
C- Measure of quality: Hanushek and Woessmann (2009), IV
QualityHW
64−03 0.084 0.124 0.120 0.116 0.093 0.184 0.177 0.177 0.187









lny60 0.026 0.031 0.012 0.008 0.023 0.092 0.135 0.124 0.131 0.127
(0.027) (0.021) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.054) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026)
R2 0.169 0.393 0.543 0.557 0.621 0.706 0.609 0.786 0.781 0.755
C o u n t r i e s 4 44 4 4 2 4 2 4 04 0 4 34 3 4 3 4 3
F-test ﬁrst-stage 26.15 23.76 35.44 34.52 12.42 8.76 22.22 20.78 18.92 0.97
Additional d+- col. 2 col. 3 col. 4 col. 5 d+- col. 7 col. 7




Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c stand for signiﬁcance level at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.
Dependent variable is the share of population 25 years and above with secondary education (columns 1-6) and enrollment rates
in secondary education (columns 7-10). In panel A dependent variable is measured in period t and explanatory variables also
include time dummies. In panel B and C dependent variable is measured as an average over the period 2000-2010.Table 3
Dependent variable: Quantity of education, averaged 2000-2010
H1 H2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A- Measure of quantity: Secondary Education
Attainment level
1990−2010 population25−39 H
    (+)
1990−2010 population25−39
QualityHK
60−90 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.060 0.048 0.034









lny60 0.067 0.076 -0.017 -0.016 0.012 -0.021 1.028 1.296 1.062 0.938
(0.027) (0.024) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.199) (0.166) (0.172) (0.171)
R2 0.359 0.535 0.612 0.613 0.641 0.708 0.621 0.726 0.746 0.761
Countries 72 72 66 66 63 63 72 72 72 72









2003 0.061 0.062 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.059 0.082 0.112 0.085
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.053) (0.032) (0.035)
lny1960 0.056 0.054 0.031 0.030 0.034 0.025 0.179 0.185 0.179
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019)
R2 0.502 0.724 0.738 0.739 0.738 0.756 0.648 0.814 0.816
C o u n t r i e s 8 28 2 7 5 7 5 7 37 3 7 17 1 7 0








60−90 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
lny60 -0.024 -0.034 0.034 0.044 0.057 0.061 0.028 0.020 0.013
(0.024) (0.023) (0.041) (0.042) (0.051) (0.053) (0.023) (0.015) (0.017)
R2 0.042 0.127 0.227 0.254 0.316 0.461 0.041 0.542 0.551
C o u n t r i e s 7 27 2 6 6 6 6 6 36 3 7 17 1 7 1
Additional d+- col. 2 col. 3 col. 4 col. 5 d+- col. 7 col. 7
Controls PSEduc− YearsComp FD− FE Educ− Educ−
lnurb−
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c stand for signiﬁcance level at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.Table 4
Dependent variable: Average Growth rate of real per capita GDP, 1960-2004
H3 H4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lny60 -0.0090 -0.0110 -0.0108 -0.0093 -0.0094


























R2 0.560 0.648 0.534 0.569 0.619
Countries 72 72 72 72 72
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) H3 H4
lny60 -0.0102 -0.0102 -0.0111 -0.0092 -0.0089























R2 0.490 0.567 0.649 0.503 0.588
Countries 72 72 72 72 72
Additional controls:
(I/GDP)60−90 (G/GDP)60−90, Trade 60−90, Inﬂation60−90
Note: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and 10 per cent
signiﬁcance level respectively. Quality of education is measured through scores in international comparable
test, taken from Hanushek and Kimko (2000).CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
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